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1. INTRODUCTION
The following article summarizes some of the principal areas of activity 
of the authors who worked as INTERTECT nutrition and public health consultants 
to the Brandi Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in Comalia between March and September, I960. A third team member who 
assisted UNHCR as a logistics consultant participated in many of the activities, 
especially those related to the analysis and recommendations regarding the 
distribution of Basic Pood Rations.
These activities draw on expertise developed by UNHCR and INTERTECT in 
Thailand, 1975-60, and on the pioneering work of other nutrition and public 
health specialists operating during previous natural and man-made disasters 
throughout the world*
For clarity, the work described here is divided into the three major 
operational objectives originally required by the consultant contract* It 
should be appreciated that for practical reasons the implementation of strategies 
designed to comply with each objective resulted in planning activities that 
were overlapping and complementary• It is anticipated that the strategies 
described in these three case histories will be of general application, with 
suitable geographical and cultural modifications, in future disaster situations 
where appropriate medium- and long-term planning in health and nutrition 
service delivery must be developed as soon as the initial emergency phase 
is passed*
2. THE ROLE CF UNHCR
As a non-operational UN agency, UNHCR has the dual role in refugee situa­
tions, upon the invitation of the host country', of coordinating the provision 
of assistance and protection for refugees* UNHCR does not of itself provide 
relief to refugees, but coordinates the appeal for assistance throughout the 
international community* Due to the manner in which UNHCR is established,
the agency coordinates technical expertise available from other UN and govern­
mental agencies, private voluntary organizations (PVCs), and national institu­
tions in the host country, as opposed to providing technical personnel directly*
Despite recent rapid developments in the state of the art, the provision 
of health and nutrition services to refugees and other disaster vietims is 
still frequently reported in the literature to be deficient, or even chaotic*
The causes, where they have been analysed, often prove to be based on severe 
deficiencies in medium- and lon^-range planning* Increasingly, UNHCR has 
recognized that its own health and nutrition planning capacity is limited by 
the non-technical nature of its staff* This recognition has developed to the 
point where UNHCR has utilized consultants to provide technical planning exper­
tise to Branch Office staff in Thailand (1979“80) and Somalia (1980)*
The authors feel that these initiatives are highly beneficial and long 
overdue. Within UNHCR itself, the need from this point onward remains to 
disseminate the application of the lessons learned among regional desks and 
national programmes, so that expertise and experience gained in either Thailand 
or Somalia may be of advantage in other existing and futufc© refugee situations* 
It should be noted, however, that there are other agencies in the UN family 
which could also benefit from the rigorous application of these principles 
in their field operations*
As UNHCR gradually becomes more professionally competent in its approach 
to thee© technical issues, its coordinating role may be enhanced* It is hoped 
that this and other factors may have a positive effect on the increasingly 
common tendency towards interagency rivalry and uncoordinated individuality
amongst some FVCs which diminishes the effectiveness and increases the cost of 
service delivery to refugees.
3. BACKGROUND TO H -Alii! AND NUTRITION -yHHVirT. DIXIV: RY TO SOMALI RiEVOKES
The current movement of refugees into Somalia became significant in num­
bers in 1978, and grew slowly during 1979 to an official figure of approximately 
400,000 at the end of that year* At the date of writing (September, 1980), 
that figure has doubled to just over* 800,000 refugees in 26 camps in four dis­
tinct regions. Recently the influx tapered off to the region of 2,000 new 
refugees per week, and continues to decrease. For reasons beyond the scope of 
this article, the age- and sex- structure of the refugee population is biased 
towards women add children*
As in other man-made disaster situations, the refugees, ethnic Somalis 
and related groups from "Western Somalia" (Ethiopia), have been settled in 
temporary camps without access to their traditional economic activities* 
Previously about 60§£ had followed a principally nomadic, pastoralist way of 
life5 the other 40, were mostly subsistence farmers, in addition to a few 
urban dwellers* In all cases, they were and continue to be almost wholly
dependent on the host Government* of Somalia (GOS) for health and nutrition 
services*
Only a very small proportion of the refugees have significant resources 
in terms of animal herds or grain harvests which are still controlled by them 
or their family and clan members on either side of the border* In most cases, 
those resources have apparently been sold, destroyed by military action or 
drought, or surrendered to Ethiopian MexpansionM*
■Hie GQS requested some international assistance late in 197& to cope with 
the refugee situation, but it was not until October, 1979* that an emergency 
was declared which led UNHCR to mount a massive international appeal beginning 
in November* Under UNHCR coordination, and in collaboration with the GGS 
National Refugee Commission (NEC), combined health and nutrition services were 
quickly organized on an ad hoc basis.
Expatriate health personnel Here provided in several camps by a few FVO* 
as eajrly as late 1979* Health matters for refugees were initially administered 
by a health section within the Department of Social Services of the NRC*
April, 1980, there were about 25 expatriate volunteers and 100 salaried Somali 
health workers providing services to the refugees* The expatriates were brought 
in under ^ri-Partite Agreements (individual contracts between UNHCR, the NRC 
representing the GOS, and each FVO) defining the responsibilities of each 
party and setting the number of workers and camps or areas to be covered* At 
this time, a Refugee Health Unit (KHU) was created within the NRC, with a Somali 
physician with refugee camp experience as its head, assisted by a handful of 
Somali health personnel seconded from the MGH* For the next four months, 
during which time the expatriate health worker presence had grown to about 75t 
and approximately 1,000 Community Health VJorkers were undergoing training, 
there was ambivalence over whether the RHU should continue to be administered 
by the NRC. In August, I960, the REIT established offices within the RGB, with 
additional Somali personnel and a long-term expatriate adviser. However, the 
government signatory to the ‘Eri—Partite Agreements for FVO health workers 
remained as the NEC*
Medicines and medical equipment and supplies began to arrive with other 
non-food aid early in I98O as a material response from the international commun­
ity to the UNHCR appeal. Gome of this aid arrived as unsolicited donations, 
ymri -oart was arranged under the Tri—Partite Agreements. In many cases, supplies 
went directly to the agency responsible for its donation, without passing 
into the general pool of refugee aid.
Since early I98O the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the European Economic Community (EEC), the World Food Programme of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (WFP) and UNHCR have provided the bulk of
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4the food aid delivered to Somalia* WFP has coordinated the entire planning
and deliver:/ of food aid, in collaboration with UNHCH* The NRC receives most 
of this aid for Basic Food nations on behalf of the GfOO at the ports of Moga­
dishu and Berbera and releases it for national distribution by internal road 
transport to the regional and camp stores* The food for Supplementary and 
Intensive Feeding Programmes for vulnerable groups is handled on behalf of 
WFP by the Food Aid Department of the Ministry of National Planning and local 
Govexmaat and similarly trucked to regional and camp stores*
The WFP Branch Office in Mogadishu has published a monthly food aid 
report since about April, 1$$0* Utilizing* current and projected refugee popu­
lation statistics issued by the NRC, the WFP report provides updated informa­
tion on the annual food requirements and current pledges and deficits with 
which to approach international donors for new food pledges*
4* BADXc FCCD iW-TIDNP 
4•1 Justification
Deficiencies of quantity and quality in the provision of Basic Food 
Rations had been reported as early as April (l)• These problems had been 
brought to the attention of WFP Headquarters in Rome by representatives of 
UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva in the same month* WFP responded by accelerating 
a number of its scheduled food deliveries to Somalia, and although this 
alleviated the situation to a certain extent, it soon became clear that this 
was far from a complete solution* It was evident that the quantity and quality 
of Basic Food Rations required much more detained examination and more far- 
reaching strategies to improve this fundamental service to refugees*
During the 12-month period from July 1979 to I960, nearly 100,000
m*t* of food commodities were actually donated to and arrived in Somalia for 
refugee assistance* This represented some 85F of the theoretical requirements* 
Only in the case of the items procured locally, meat and sugar, were serious 
deficiencies experienced due to the lack of cash funds for their purchase* 
However, upon analysing feed-back from expatriate sources in the camps, it 
was unofficially estimated by the food agencies that no more than 5®, of fhe 
imported foodstuffs actually reached the refugee beneficiaries for whom they 
were intended*
Of the eight conraodities in the Food Basket designed early in 1$80 by 
,IFP, no more than four or five commodities were distributed during ar^ r month 
during the first three quarters of the ear* The quantities delivered were 
small so that camp reserves of more than a few days supply never developed, 
and most distributions were arranged on an ad hoc basis directly off the trucks*
5Often commodities -were delivered singly* for long and irregular periods* It 
therefore proved impossible for the refugees to prepare an acceptable nutri­
tious meal with more than two or three components* without resorting to the 
barter or sale of part of their rations in exchange for other commodities*
Most often they cooked boiled rice with oil* fried maize-meal pancakes or 
wheat-flour "fry-bread***
For this reason* active markets for refugee food developed in the camps 
(often mio—interpreted by casual observers as evidence of food sufficiency 
in those camps* and in the local towns and villages (likewise mis—interpreted 
by casual observers as evidence of corruption and theft amongst camp officials)* 
The refugees sought to eat their traditional diet from time to time* and 
purchased inilk and meat (also some vegetables* spices and sugar) for more 
abundant oil and cereals* From June to August * mounting dissatisfaction with 
the Basic Rations took the form of a series of unrelated, spontaneous raids 
on Supplementary Food stores in several camps# Milk was the usual object of 
theft during these raids#
In the April assessment report (l)* it was pointed out that even if the 
Food Basket were to be delivered regularly in its entirety, tlie refugee diet
would still exiiibit certain nutritional deficiencies* which /ere identified* 
in order of priority, as follows:
a) low iron content* possibly responsible for the high prevalence of 
anemia reported by modi cal teams in the camps}
b) low vitamin 0 content, although symptoms suggestive of scurvy were
only reported in one camp}
c) low niacin content, although pellagra has not been reported*
B ig original Food Basket in use up to August 1$$0 is presented in Table 
1* (Bee Table 3 for a complete analysis of the nutrient composition of the
Food Basket.)
It was also rioted that due to limited dietary diversity, the population 
relied in some cases on a single foodstuff to supply almost all oi a specific 
nutrient# For example, almost all the vitamin C and calcium in the Food Basket 
was derived from DBM. If this product became scarce because of erratic distri­
bution* serious deficiency symptoms would be expected in the population over 
the long-term* Further, the occasional absence of maize or sorghum from food 
deliveries meant that almost half the daily ration was missing* Since sub­
stitution with other cereals was not practised, the calorie intake of the 
refugees was seriously reduced during periods of cereal shortages* overall
calorie deficiency experienced by the refugees was constantly reported in the 
form of poor nutritional status, principally among the vulnerable group of 
young children (see section 6*3)#
6Table 1. Gradual Somali Refugee Food Basket (up to AMfflMk-lSflB)*
Commodity Ration (g*) per person per day
Maize/sorghum* 230
lice 75
Flour2 75
Oil 40
DSM3 50
Sugar/dates* 40
Tea 3
Meat 20
Total 553
* interchangeable commodity groupings
penriched wheat flour
•>
dried skimmed milk, enriched with vitamins A and D 
4*2 Objectives
In order to conanence the correction of the inadequacies in the provision 
of Basic Rations described above, the issues of quantity and quality were 
necessarily separated, although a completely integrated approach to analysis and 
planning was adopted from the outset*
4*2*1 It m s  recognised at an early stage that the reasons for the insuffi­
ciency in food deliveries to the camps, despite the apparent adequacy of 
arrivals at the ports, could be discovered in the complex system through which 
the commodities were handled between port and camp* This structure was very 
poorly understood by the majority of the agencies involved, including UNHCR, 
so that the first step required a detained examination of the entire ware­
housing, trucking, financing and camp-level distribution system through which 
each refugee commodity moved within Somalia*
4*2*2 Hie elucidation of the system was hampered by lack of adequate and 
accessible records* An important objective for the food donor agencies (USAID, 
ESC, WFP, UNHCR) throughout these activities was to improve accountability. 
Auditors from the headquarters of both USAID and EEC had pressured their 
Branch Office staff with the prospect of a cut-off in supplies if they could 
not establish normal accounting for the commodities from origin to point of 
distribution*
4*2*3 At the camp level, the development of more adequately stocked food 
stores v/as identified as the most appropriate strategy to relieve the irregular­
ity of food distributions and the unpredictability of commodity availability
7to the refugees* Methods were also sought to make the distributions more 
equitable through the development of standard procedures for family food alloca- 
tion by time interval and household size*
4*2*4 She alleviation of nutrient deficiencies in the Food Basket was dealt 
with separately at the national level* It was recognised that the addition 
of certain commodities and/or the substitution of others, through the careful 
compromise of factors relating to availability, cost, acceptability and nutri­
tional value, would result in the formation of a new, more adequate Food 
Basket*
4*3 Methodology
The INTERSECT team guided the UNHCR BO staff through a series of analyti­
cal steps leading to proposals for intervention in close collaboration with 
the appropriate GOS Ministries, the SBC, the food donor agencies, and the 
centrally—controlled state food agencies (ADC and ENG)* Logistical informa­
tion was collected during field visits to port facilities, shipping agents, 
the state food agenciesS storage facilities in ports and regions, and camp 
stores, distribution points and deeding centres* Field reports and technical 
memoranda were given wide circulation amongst the agencies in order to facili­
tate discussion of the issues at all levels* Since it was recognized from 
the outset that final responsibility for the implementation of improvements 
in the provision of Basic Rations lie with GOS Ministries and the NEC, all 
efforts were directed at the fullest participation of appropriate officials 
in the formulation of corrective logistical strategies*
4*3*1 Food luantitv
Close examination of the food distribution mechanism revealed it to be 
a *eo-cningledrt system# Upon arrival in port ’warehouses and regional stores, 
the state food agencies did not handle commodities donated by the interna­
tional coommity for the refugees any differently from other stocks commer­
cially purchased from overseas or from national agricultural production*
Food supplies ./ere found to be distributed through a requisition system, 
without appropriate priorities, to the general public, hospitals, schools, 
the army and the refugees* Inland transport costs were found to be inadequately 
funded by UNHCR so that commodities were monetized to pay for truck maintenance 
and fuel, drivers* salaries and porterage# Unpaid stevedoring charges at 
Mogadishu port delayed distribution of almost 1,000 m*t* DSN for three months 
(some milk was declared unfit and destroyed), and the SRC's enormous unpaid 
haulage bills (over US£1 million) threatened to shut down the distribution 
System indefinitely# Other problems involving damage and loss due to multiple 
handling were uncovered* Losses due directly to theft were found to be of a 
minor nature in most areas*
It became clear by July that the solution to the observed logistical in­
effectiveness would involve the separation of refugee food assistance from 
non-refugee supplies* !he necessary agency representatives were brought together 
in a series of informal meetings in which alternative strategies for this re­
organization were discussed, and at this point WFP took the lead by presenting 
the general consensus to the GCS in written form* In essence, it was proposed 
that all responsibility for Basic Ration distribution should pass, through a 
phased transition, to the NRC* 'Ihe food donor agencies recognised that this 
would be the only mechanist! through which adequate accountability for the pro­
vision of food to the camps could be assured*
In August, the 003 National Pteergency Committee approved the proposal and 
the NRC initiated a series of planning steps to assess its preparedness to take 
over logistical responsibility for the entire Rood Basket* The administrative 
and operational task involved gearing up this relatively new 003 Institution 
to handle approximately 200,000 m*t* of food per year from the end of I960*
The most difficult obstacle was that of the staggering recurrent coots of this 
operation (estimated at over U3S10 million per year)* Monetised USAID Title I 
funds would help to cover some of these costs, but large donations of cash would 
have to be found for an extended period from international assistance sources* 
Second only to this was the problem of upgrading the food programme administra­
tion capacity of the NEC management. Various alternatives for the solution of 
both needs were discussed during on-going planning sessions at NRC before full 
responsibility for the reorganization was accepted.
New EDQ trucks and other vehicles, maintenance facilities and mechanics 
pledged to the SRC earlier in the year arrived botwsea August and October* 
September, the NRC had developed its logistical capacity to the point where it 
took over the food distribution previously covered by one of the two state food 
agencies, in addition to handling all Supplementary Food and non-food aid*
At the camp level, food storage capacity was low due to the lack of stores 
of adequate size and quality* A construction programme organized by UNHCR was 
subject to at least six months’ delay, so that interim solutions were initiated 
to cover the inanediate construction of food stores* By September, almost all 
camps had more or less adequate food stores with 20 days’ or more overall capacity*
4*3*2 Food quality
The process of the modification of the Food Basket involved a series of 
food planning meetings attended by the representatives of the appropriate 
agencies* For this purpose, the INTERTECT nutritionist reported on the nutri­
tional inadequacies of the existing rations, and presented an analysis of the 
cost and nutritional composition of a large variety of commodities currently
available from the major food donors and other foodstuffs available for procure*
ment in Somalia, and elsewhere in the region# In addition, technical data was 
presented regarding average recommended daily allowances for individual nutrients, 
and indigenous nutritional patterns amongst Somalia of different socio-economic 
groups*
A synthesis of these discussions was presented in the form of a proposal 
in which a balance was sought between the constraints of commodity availability, 
nutritional content, cost and acceptability* With modifications, consensus
was reached on a revised Food Basket in August* WFP immediately adopted the 
new ration for food aid planning purposes*
The revised Food Basket is presented in Table 2, and a comparative analysis 
of the nutrient composition of the previous and revised Food Baskets is presented 
in Table 3*
Table 2* Revised Somali Refugee Pood Basket (from August* IB80}.
Commodity
Ration (g*) per Total requirement (m*t*) for 
X) refugees * per yearperson per day 900,0C
maize/;sor^hiBa/rioe 300
(200/50/50)
96,600
flour^/CSK1 100
(75/25)
32,940
611 40 13,176
DSJr 50 16,470
bugar 40 13,176
dates 10 3,294
tea 3 986
meat 10 3,294
beans 40 /3j
salt 2 65?
Total 555 155,573
^interchangeable eoromodity groupings 2enriched wheat flour
■%wT enriched with vitamins A and 1)
A
average projected population for July 1, i960 to June 30, 1981 
4*4 Preliminary Results
4*4*1 Deliveries of Basic Rations to camps are now more regular and efficiently 
organized? with improved record-keeping? than at any previous period during the 
current relief operation* However? the transfer of full responsibility for 
food distribution to the NRC is still incomplete, so that several administrative
10
*2able 3* Comparative analysis of the Nutrient Composition of the Original
and Revised Somali Refugee Food Baskets. I960.
Or/3/na L Revised
Nutrient Food Basket RDAX Goal Food Basket
energy (calories) 2,135 2,300 2,237
protein (g*) 5£ 40 70
vitamin A (l.U.) 4,410 2,500 4,590
thiamine (mg*) 1.8 1.0 2.2
niacin (mg*) 12 18 15
Vitamin C (mg*) 4 30 14
iron (mg*) o✓ 15 15
calcium (mg*) 725 600 1*033
^Receesmended Daily Allowance* taken from (2)
aspects of the operation are as yet unresolved* At the time of writing* efforts 
were 'being made to obtain professional expatriate personnel to assist the NRC 
to fully establish its food programme management capacity for the long—tana* 
Pood deliveries to the refugees were threatened by fuel rationing caused 
the cut-off of Iraqi crude oil supplies from the beginning of the Iran-Iraq 
War in late September* However, UNHCR secured a commitment from the GOS to 
give the HRC priority status in the rationing system to permit the trucks to 
roll with minimal interruption*
4*4*2 Resistance on the part of the 00b to the formal registration of refugee 
families and to the general issue of ration cards through which to ensure 
equitable distribution by family size has not been overcome* It was generally 
assumed that the NRC regarded the issue of ration cards as a de facto census 
of the refugee population* and this was not perceived to comply with the best 
interests of Somalia as a whole*
4*4*3 Ihe implementation of the modified Food Basket has been relatively 
trouble-free. At the time of writing, pledges of food assistance from the 
international coiammity for the year July 1, l$bO to June 30* 1581, for cereals* 
milk, wheat flour, CSM, oil and beans are almost complete* Meat, sugar* salt 
and tea continue to remain largely unpledged since* for the most part* they 
require cash for local or regional procurement* It is notoriously difficult 
for WFP to obtain pledges of cash for the provision of food aid*
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5* HEALTH PEOGRAiflHES 
5*1 Justification
From the beginning of the Somali refugee influx, health workers in the 
camps had recognized several health conditions as being of major significance, 
although at first diagnoses were not confirmed nor were cases quantified 
statistically* The most common of these was malnutrition, including anaemia, 
especially in young children* This was complicated by periodic epidemics of 
preventable childhood diseases, such as measles and whooping cough* Together 
with diarrhoea from unclean water supplies and poor standards of hygiene, 
these diseases most probably caused a high death rate among under-5s* Respira­
tory diseases, especially tuberculosis (TB^ also seemed to be wide-spread*
Most health workers estimated the active TB rate at about 9$, although some 
claimed higher, less realistic rates* Skin diseases ’were also highly prevalent* 
Bilharzia and malaria were known to be present, but al'a low level*
lack of clean water was a problem in all camps, and in the Northwest region 
refugees had to obtain meagre supplies by painstakingly digging holes in the 
dry beds of wet—season rivers* Latrines were a low priority, partly because 
health workers believed that the dry desert climate prevented indiscriminate 
defecation from posing a severe health threat, and because of the cultural 
difficulty of educating refugees in the public health desirability of their use*
Several problems vfere identified in organizing health service delivery 
for Somali refugees that are common to similar long-term disasters:
5*1.1 A lack of available* reliable information on the health status of the 
refugees for the purpose of planning* There was no uniform system for the 
regular collection of data, and clinic records were of inconsistent quality 
and kept in at least four languages. Few key personnel had the opportunity 
to visit camps in all the four regions to even visually compare the situation* 
5*1*2 Conflicting service delivery philosophies of different PVQtt* Recognizing 
the long-term nature of the problem, development-oriented FVO8 only provided 
health care where they could involve the refugee community, and train Somalis, 
giving emphasis to preventive activities* Other agencies saw the situation 
only as a crisis, sending personnel on short-term contracts to provide erner ency— 
style curative services in isolation*
5*1*3 Conflicting philosophies toward foreign aid within the gpvernffiegt*
Certain sectors responsible for dealing with offers of aid felt that it was 
in the best interests of the refugees to accept any and all assistance offered, 
including expatriate personnel, without regard to its appropriateness* Others 
wanted to screen such assistance before the signing of Tri-Partite Agreements, 
especially where personnel might be sent to perform work that Somalis could do, 
or where high technology solutions were to be installed that the GGJ would be 
unable to maintain in the long run*
S.l*4 Conflict of service delivery for refugees versus the rest of the rural 
population. Borne Somali officials felt it was inappropriate to provide a 
higher standard of health care within the Refugee camps than was available 
to the rest of the population, both for internal political reasons and because 
this standard was unlikely to be maintained in the long term. The interest 
of the international community in the refugees will not be sustained indefinitely, 
and many FVOs will ultimately withdraw from the scene.
5*1*5 Lack of service standardization. Medicines and medical equipment and 
supplies used in each camp were inconsistent. There were no basic treatments 
for common diseases due to the use of various medical approaches and philoso­
phies. Borne medicines were wasted due to inappropriate use by poorly trained 
or inexperienced personnel. The number and quality of health personnel and their 
distribution varied drastically• In some camps there were no permanent physi­
cians! in others expatriate ones were frequently underutilized.
5*2 Objectives
To attack these problems, the MOH was encouraged to initiate medium- and 
long-term planning at the national level to meet the health needs of the refugee 
population. Intrinsic in this planning -was an emphasis on preventive rather 
than curative health services. It was based on a philosophy of health care 
delivery by the RHD, through the basic structure of the Somali health service, 
assisted by expatriates where necessary, and with a new cadre of local health 
workers, the Community Health 'orker (CHW), to be trained. Services would be 
consistent as far as possible with that available outside the camps, or would 
serve as model programmes that might later be extended to the national health 
services.
5*3 Methodology
The methodology utilized to comply with these objectives was to bring 
together key individuals from agencies interested in refugee health, and 
utilise their collective expertise to set minimum standards of health care 
delivery. It was assumed that through such standardization, the refugees would 
' receive better health care, and it would become possible to evaluate the effects 
of the various health interventions at the field level. Key steps in this 
process included;
5*3.1 The MOH invited the Center for Disease Control (CDC) to send a tetjmof 
epidemiologists to collect data on the health and nutritional status of the 
refugees. The first survey was carried out in Kay, I960 (3), and longitudinal 
information was collected in subsequent surveys conducted over the next few 
months (4*5*6)*
5*3*2 A refugee health plan vets drawn up for the PJIU with participation of 
individuals from KCH, World Health Organisation (WHO)* CDC and UNICEF in Hay*
The result of several meetings* primarily at the initiation of WHO* this plan 
included recommendations for numbers of expatriate and local staff* established 
basic numbers of health centres and posts depending on the size of each camp* 
estimated medical equipment requirements for the rest of 1980* and established 
a plan for the refugee immunization programme. This rather ambitious mass 
immunization programme envisioned the protection of all refugee children against 
Six common diseasest polio* diptheria* pertussis* tetanus* measles and TB*
The programme was designed as far as possible to be consistent with VIH0#s 
Expanded Programme of Immunization for developing countries.
5*3*3 The HOB convened a three-day health seminar in June, at the suggestion 
of the CDC team, and with the active participation of the RHU* UTEERTBCT team 
members representing UNHCR* and UNICEF* and representation of Somali regional 
health personnel, FVO health teams, and other interested agencies. The seminar 
discussed and accepted with modifications proposals for mortality and morbidity 
data collection reports, standard guidelines for feeding programmes* standard 
treatment regimes for common diseases, and a basic drug list. These standards 
had been drafted primarily by the MOH* amended according to consensus* and were 
approved by the Minister of Health in July. They were then distributed in 
loose-leaf notebook form in Somali and English languages to all health workers. 
5*3*4 Under the auspices of the MOH* UNICEF and WHO, with technical advice 
from the CDC team, the Post-Basic Health School, the INTERSECT team* and other 
sources, a training programme for CHWs was planned and implemented. It was 
envisioned that the CHWs, once trained, would initiate or amplify preventive 
health activities, such as health education classes, and. provide a very basic 
level of curative services in all the camps. The selection and training of 
CHWs was commenced in the camps in August by tutors and students of the Somali 
Post—Basic Health School* The first round of training aho ld be completed by 
February, 1581.
5*3*5 On the basis of the above plans and seminars, medicine and medical supply 
and equipment lists were quantified according to the available data on usage and 
probable disease rates, and the May RHU plan. UNHCR undertook to find suitable 
donors by the distribution of these lists to interested FVOs. The equipment 
list included cold chain equipment with which to make it possible to maintain 
an on-going immunization programme in the refugee camps*
5*3*8 The RHU was gradually strengthened through material support from UNHCR 
and other agencies, and moral and technical support from the MOH and expatriate 
advisors including the authors* Initially, this was on an informal basis as 
expertise was available from CDC, UNHCR, etc., but a long-term Senior Medical 
Advisor was assigned from Cxfam and arrived in September.
5*3*7 The RHU initiated the formulation of a formal work—plan and budget (for 
1981) 9 to assure support for its operation and delivery of services to refugees
at an adequate level for at least one further year*
5*3*8 Gradually, water supply was improved in many camps* Various methods were 
used, including simple shallow and medium depth wells, solar pumps, and expensive 
diesel-pump and chemical purification systems*
5*3*9 Latrine building programmes were expanded, and some interest and under­
standing of the ■underlying health concepts began to develop among the refugees*
5*4 Preliminary Results
The initial results of the above efforts include some- successes and some 
further problemss
5*4*1 There is now standardized collection of data on mortality and morbidity 
in all camps in only two languages, Somali and English* This information is 
recorded in specific books in each health centre, collected and reported on a 
one-page form monthly to the RHU* Routine disease surveillance lias thus been 
established in a rudimentary form*
5*4*2 There is more useful information available on morbidity rates and fre­
quency of disease in the camps, permitting more rational ordering and distribu­
tion of supplies and medicines from the Central Medical Store*
5*4*3 Most children have been immunized against the common disease of childhood* 
This should prevent epidemics and reduce under—5 mortality* Sufficient cold 
chain equipment has been pledged to make an on-going immunisation programme 
viable* Several problems in the initial immunization rounds, such as poor 
technique on the part of student vaccinators, break-down of the cold chain, 
and erratic record-keeping, were analysed and are now mostly resolved*
5*4*4 Outstanding medicine and medical equipment needs for I58O have been 
pledged, and a more even supply of this assistance to the camps is now possible* 
5*4*5 Over 1,000 refugees have received at least a month * s training as CRMs*
The MOH has oommited itself to continuing the programme as a pilot project for 
all of Somalis.* Through •his programme, PVOs have been sensitized to the impor­
tance of the involvement of indigenous paraprofessionals in health care activities* 
5*4*8 The RHU is now a viable entity, better capable of making planning deci­
sions regarding the utilization of existing human and material resources, and 
the matching of future needs with offers of assistance*
5*4*7 Some PVOs have improved their services to refugees to meet the minimum 
standards required by the RHU* The process of participating in planning sessions 
has helped to minimise the effects of philosophical differences between PVOs* 
Because of excessive work-loads, however, full implementation of standard pro­
cedures at the field level is still deficient in some areas* The frequent lack 
of coordination between RHU and NRC before the signing of Tri—Partite Agreements
with expatriate health teams continues to inhibit the RHU*s administrative and 
supervisory role*
5*4*8 In order to partially overcome the lack of coordination of FVO health and 
nutrition activities, short orientation courses for in-coming field personnel 
are offered by the KHU* However* since the RHU has no formal administrative 
authority over the PVOs, not all PVOs have taken. advantage of this essential 
opportunity*
6* Selective Feeding Pro^ammes 
6.1 Justification
It was reported in April (l) that Selective Feeding Programmes (SFPs) 
for vulnerable groups were poorly established or non-existent in Somali refugee 
camps* Ho more than a handful of comp medical teams had recognised the need 
for SFPs, and very few had given priority to the development of Feeding Centres*
Where Feeding Centres did operate, they were small* The food was usually 
distributed to the mothers of malnourished children in the fora of dry rationsf 
the quantity and type of food varied between camps* However, little or no 
standardization of the criteria for enrollment or discharge of beneficiaries
in SJPs had been established*
Early attempts at SFP planning at the national level had been undertaken 
by WF? with little participation by the KOII* This planning had taken the fora 
of arbitrarily setting the overall percentage of SFP beneficiaries at 15% of 
the total refugee population* This figure was supposed to cover malnourished 
children, pregnant women and the elderly, but these categories were not medi­
cally defined, nor was the figure based on any objective statistical data*
From an early stage in the refugee relief operation, it had been correctly 
recognised that SH»s should fall within the sphere of the refugee health ser­
vice* The provision of Supplementary Feeding Programmes for the protection of 
vulnerable population groups (moderately malnourished children, pregnant and 
Instating women, the severely sick and very elderly) is actually a preventive 
health service* The provision of Intensive Feeding Programmes for the rapid 
recuperation of severely malnourished children, is largely a curative health 
operation. Both programmes are administered simultaneously by health personnel 
in most disaster situations, although they are theoretically and practically 
very dissimilar. In the Somali refugee camps, in the absence of any consistent 
surveillance mechanism with which to monitor the nutritional status of infants 
and children, the need for Intensive Feeding Programmes vent unrecognised*
As a result, almost all SFPs in existence before June were hippleoentory Pro­
grammes, i*e. severely malnourished children were given no special therapeutic 
treatment, but simply received dry rations. Since dry rations are rarely 
received exclusively for the person to whom they are given, but are usually 
re-distributed throughout the family according to social rather than nutri-
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tional priorities * then it is little wonder that mortality rates amongst 
severely malnourished children were probably unaffected by the early SIPs*
A ration scale for SFPs* making no distinction between Supplementary 
Intensive Programme beneficiaries was set by W  around the same time as the 
original Food Basket was established* to facilitate the planning of food 
assistance deliveries* The 3FP ration scale is presented in Table 4*
Table 4* Selective Feeding Programme Ration Scale and Analgesia of 
---------- Nutrient Composition for Somali Refuroea, 1980._________
Corrmodity
Ration (g.) per 
person per day
C3M1 80
M l 2 or DSM3 40
sugar 20
oil 15
To t a d 155
^ oom-soya-mi Ik "porridge1
'dried whole milk
W i e d  skimmed milk* enriched with vitamins A and D
^additional small quantities of donated tinned meat and cheese and bulk 
dried fruit are distributed when in stock
6*2 Objectives
In keeping with the move towards improved organization at the national 
level to ensure the quality of health and nutrition services, the MOH was en­
couraged to introduce rigorous standardization into the imp 1 mental ion of 
SFPs in the refugee camps. This standardization would take the form of ritten 
guidelines for the planning and implementation of Supplementary and Intensive 
Feeding Programmes* to be distributed to all camp health workers*
It was assumed that the promotion of standardized operations by the RED 
would provide the PVOs with the theoretical basis with which to complete the 
establishment of SFPs in all camps* Further* the application of standard 
guidelines would permit the improvement of the efficiency and coverage of 
SFPs, contributing to the alleviation of malnutrition and ultimately to a 
measurable improvement in the nutritional status of tie refugee population as 
a whole. It was recognised, however, that any long-term improvements in nutri­
tional status would depend on the reorganization of the provision of Basic 
Food Rations*
IT
6.3 Methodology
The strategy involved in complying with the objectives regarding SPPs 
formed an integral part of the overall strategy for the enhancement of health 
services* Key steps in the process were as follows:
6*3*1 To provide a scientific basis for the analysis of the nutritional status
of the refugee population* the CDC team undertook a series of regional sample 
surveys (see Section 5*3*1)• The age- and sex- structure of the refugee popula­
tion was determined* The base-line nutrition results of the first two surveys 
are suisnarised in Table 5*
Table 5* Nutritional Status of Refggee Infants and Children1, by
Region* Mav to June* I960 * _ _ . . . .......-..
i 3
Percent of Median
Region
Sample pn 
Si2e (normal)
71-89 (moderate 
malnutrition)
7 9  (severe 
malnutrition)
Northwest 1,004 t 71.55s m 6.5*
Hiran 553 j 79 2455 0
Gedo 949 7855 IS* %
Corioli - j 9155 i 9* -
1 110 cm. in height (corresponding approximately to 0-5 years of age)
2
Sources: (3,4)
%8§/NCHS V Jeighi-f or-Height Reference Standards
The early surveys also confirmed that the malnutrition prevalent in the 
refugee camps was of the marasmic (non-oe&ematous) type reflecting overall 
dietary energy deficiency* The Kwashiorkor (©edematous) variety reflecting 
protein deficiency was not found to be a problem*
6.3*2 Kith the aid of this ;,hard data”, a technical planning session was con­
vened by the INTERSECT nutritionist with the participation of the CDC team 
said representatives of UNHCR and the RHU* Standard guidelines for Supplementary 
and Intensive Feeding Programmes were sketched outiAn draft forts, including 
criteria for enrollment in and discharge from SFPs, Feeding Centre procedures, 
and periodic individual assessment and camp surveillance procedures, utilising 
currently accepted weight for height criteria to define moderate and severe 
malnutrition in infants and children* Romen in the last trimester of pregnancy 
and the first year of lactation, TB cases, and other sick and elderly persons 
with special problems were also formally defined as 3FP beneficiaries*
6*3.3 At the June health seminar (see Section 5*3*3)» the draft underwent 
general discussion and a consensus was reached on a modified set of guidelines
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for insnediate implementation throughout the country. In July the Minister of 
Health incorporated the 3FF guidelines into the refugee health service standards 
distributed in the form of a loose-leaf notebook in Somali and English languages 
to all health workers. The overall percentage of SFP beneficiaries was re­
affirmed at 15$ of the total refugee population, although at that time the pre­
valence of TB and the numbers of sick and elderly persons in need of supple­
mentary feeding had not been adequately quantified* From the CDC demographic 
and nutritional data, it was calculated that 5$ of the population were infants 
and children in moderate and severe states of malnutrition, and 5% were preg*- 
nant and lactating women as defined. It was roughly estimated that 2jL of the 
population were IB patients not covered by other criteria, and 3^ > as sick and 
elderly. The IB prevalence rate was later confirmed to be correct (5)*
6.3*4 Despite disadvantages of high cost and poor quality control, the Gxfam 
Feeding Kit No. 1 (OFKl) was found to be the most practical equipment with 
which to operate Supplementary Feeding Programmes. Those FVOs which established 
Intensive Feeding Programmes modified the OFKIs with additional equipment as 
they determined the need. The most notable deficiency in the OFKl is the 
absence of an adequate infant measuring board with which to undertake individual 
assessment and camp surveillance.
Total equipment requirements were assessed on the basis of up to one OFKl 
per Feeding Centre. By the time of writing almost all health teams had adequate 
quantities of GFKls with which to operate their Feeding Centres, and enou^i 
were on order to cover projected needs into 1981. The CDC team ordered infant 
measuring boards from a local carpenter, and. one was distributed to each camp. 
6.3.5 The establishment of theoretical guideline* for SFPs cannot ensure com­
pliance on the part of health workers, without adequate periodic supervision 
and support. Many of the F\TOs exhibited a poor capacity for training indigenous 
personnel and for organizing the human and physical resources necessary to 
create new Feeding Centres, due to differing priorities related to the impor­
tance of nutrition services and to lack of experience in SFP administration.
It was recognised ah an early stage that frequent supervision and support would 
be essential to ensure adequate compliance with the guidelines, but due to the 
lack of sufficient personnel and funds the HHU did not possess that capacity 
at the rational level.
The HHU resisted attempts by the INTERTECT nutritionist to design a regional 
plan for camp-level SFP supervision utilising expatriate nutrition workers 
whose services had been offered to the HHU by several FVOs. In an unfortunate 
example of poor decision-making, the HHU determined that such regional, nutrition 
workers represented an excessive expatriate influence, despite the fact that 
expatriate Regional Refugee Medical Advisors were operating with HHU approval
in three regions hy August, I98O. Ihe RHU argued that the Somali Regional 
Refugee Medical Officers could cover the responsibility for nutrition services* 
although those medical officers often displayed disinterest in preventive health 
and nutrition services* However, due to the uncoordinated mechanism for the 
acceptance of offers of assistance (see Section 5*4*7)9 the NRC had approved 
the introduction of regional nutrition workers in three out of four regions by 
August* Nevertheless, the RHU refused to acknowledge the invaluable role that 
those workers have performed*
The RHU also maintained that full responsibility for the operation of SFPs 
in all refugee camps should pass to the CHWs upon completion of their training 
early in 1981* In the opinion of most experienced public health workers in 
Somalia, the CHWs* many of whom are illiterate, willnnot have the administrative 
or practical capacity until some time after the completion of their training* 
if ever*
6l4 Preliminary Results
6*4*1 The provision of SFPs of much Improved quality and coverage has now been 
achieved* Kfficient 2'ceding Centres which provide wet rations for oxwthe-epot 
feeding twice a day to infants and children are operating in the majority of 
refugee camps. Hiere are still* however, a number of inconsistencies in service 
delivery that will require continued orientation, training and supervision from 
the RHU and the regional nutrition workers* Of particular concern is the case 
of Corioli Region (three camps) where there is no regional nutrition support 
and the SFPs consisted, at the time of writing, of a dry ration distribution 
twice per month in association with the Maternal and Child Health Clinics*
The RHU continued to refuse to accept expatriate assistance to improve the 
situation*
6*4*2 The September CDC nutrition survey (6) has shown that rates of malnutri­
tion amongst infants and children have declined in all camps (not including 
transit camps) except one in the Northwest Region* In sane cases the reduction 
in moderate and severe rates lias been dramatic* It is proposed by the authors 
that although improved camp water supply between Kay and September has probably 
caused a reduction in diaiThoeal disease and hence a reduction in malnutrition 
rates, the major factor involved has undoubtedly been the highly successful 
provision of improved SFPs in most camps* There is little evidence to suggest 
that changes in the provision of Basic Fbod Rations, environmental sanitation 
or mass tammization had any significant effect on nutritional status*
6*4*3 WFP obtained food aid pledges to fully cover 3FPs (7,638 cut* for 15$ 
of the projected average population of 900,000 refugees for the year July 1* 
1980, to June 30, 1981) by September, 1980*
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7# CONCLUSION
Hie improvements that have been achieved in health and nutritional status 
have depended on many levels of activity, from Ministers to Feeding Centre 
auxiliaries* Many refinements may prove necessary, but in essence a viable 
system has finally been established for the delivery of health and nutrition 
services to refugees.
Bio Somali refugee relief operation was slow in coming- to the attention of 
ilie international eexammity so soon after the well-publicised assistance pro­
grammes in Southern Asia# Campaigns for assistance for Thailand and Pakistan 
distracted the international ccasaunity from Somalia's urgent needs, for all 
practical purposes, until March or April, 19&0#
Hie underlying cause of the 'Somali refugees* plight, the war with Ethiopia, 
does not engender sympathy, either in Africa itself or amongst the principal 
international aid donors# Somalia*s belligerent stance, albeit justifiable, is 
not deemed appropriate chile the country is without significant resources with 
which to provide basic services to its population, much less fight a modern 
war against considerable odds#
The risk in this case is tiiat international assistance may dry up whilst
idie numbers of refugees continue to increase# New disasters like the Algerian 
earthquake may divert human and financial resources away from Somalia# Legis­
lators may find it increasingly difficult to justify aid to Somalia whilst the 
GCS remains firm in its political commitment*
Of particular concern to the authors is the risk to health and nutrition 
service delivery in the camps# The refugees are now and will continue to be 
heavily dependent on the International community for enormous quantities of 
food commodities, medical supplies and equipment, and other non-food aid in 
cash and in kind* It is essential, therefore, that alternatives for a durable 
solution to refugee settlement be analysed and implemented as soon as possible, 
in order to reduce the potential suffering that may occur if the present situa­
tion remains without a political solution for much longer#
The autliors acimowle&ge the invaluable cooperation of all those who 
facilitated this work# In particular, appreciation is extended to* Jiddo 
van Bremen, UNHCR5 Carl Hasselbla d and other CDC team members) Ali Osman Nur, 
RHJ/MOH) Olavi Elo, ISO5 John wood, WFP) Robert Lunebarg, USAID) Jean de 
Eyckman, ESC) Dwight owartzendmiber, INTHRTECT#
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